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Notes
Borrowing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
to Finance Lender Liability Claims
by
ANN-MARIE DAVIDOW*
Lender liability: "The hot legal theory of the 1980's."1 Borrowers
and their attorneys fear that California is stopping the trend to "protect
innocent borrowers from the sometimes arbitrary and capricious actions
of their bankers."' 2 By denying borrowers' claims against lenders for tor-
tious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ("cov-
enant"), California courts appear to be "foreclosing on lender liability."'3
Some observers perceive the California Supreme Court's decision in
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,4 denying tort damages for breach of the
covenant in employment termination cases, as fatal to claims for tortious
breach in lender liability cases.5 This Note, however, argues that Foley
does not bring to an end the era of redressing borrowers' injuries through
tort damages. To the contrary, Foley provides the necessary guidelines to
determine under what circumstances tort damages are warranted for a
lender's bad faith breach of a lending agreement.
* B.S. 1988, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo; Member, Third
year class.
I. Burkhardt, Court Rulings Reduce Banks' Liability, Make It Harder for Businesses to
Challenge Lenders, San Francisco Examiner, June 25, 1989, at Dl, col. 2.
2. Id.
3. Checchio, Foreclosing on Lender Liability, (San Francisco) Daily Recorder, Nov. 13,
1989, at 1, col. I (stating that in the previous 18 months, four appellate court decisions have
denied plaintiffs' lender liability tort claims).
4. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
5. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 741
(1989) (stating that the Foley court's analysis questions the propriety of the tort in lender
liability cases); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 730, 260 Cal. Rptr.
793, 795 (1989) (stating that although the Foley court left open the possibility of allowing the
tort in lender liability cases, the California Supreme Court would not find a lender's breach
tortious in an ordinary arms-length loan transaction); see also Burkhardt, supra note 1, at D6,
col. 2 (suggesting that Foley shows the California Supreme Court may be "reluctant to award
punitive damages to injured borrowers").
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In its analysis of the employer-employee relationship, the Foley
court reaffirmed that the contractual relationship between the insurer
and insured is not at arms length. 6 The insured reasonably places great
reliance on the insurer not to refuse arbitrarily to pay the insured's claim.
The Foley court identified the factors justifying the insured's reliance:
the economic dilemma suffered by the insured when forced to present a
claim, the quasi-public nature of the service provided by the insurer, and
the adversity of interests that results from the insurer's economic incen-
tive to breach the insurance agreement and invest the funds. 7 Tort dam-
ages for bad faith breach of the insurance contract both compensate the
insured and deter the insurer from breaching.
Similarly, this Note argues that in certain lender liability cases these
justifications warrant tort damages for bad faith breach of a loan agree-
ment. A borrower who risks substantially everything to obtain financing
may reasonably rely on the lender not to refuse to extend credit arbitrar-
ily. The financial ruin caused by a bad faith breach often cannot be com-
pensated sufficiently by contract damages, which are limited in scope.
Furthermore, in certain situations the lender would find it economically
beneficial to breach the loan agreement and invest the loan funds else-
where at a higher rate of return.
Unfortunately, courts have not identified what situations warrant
relief beyond contract damages. Nor have courts devised a scheme to
equalize the interests of lenders and borrowers so that bad faith breach is
not as desirable to the lender and not as devastating to the borrower.
A California court of appeal recently stated that "[a]lthough [bor-
rowers] argue the holding in Foley did not eliminate tort liability for the
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the commercial
contract context of this case . . ., the plain fact is such an action never
existed." 8 Perhaps it is true that the action has never existed. Most
courts, however, assume that the action exists, but try to determine if the
facts warrant tort recovery without first attempting to define the scope of
the tort. Regardless of whether such an action currently exists, the ques-
tion is: Should a tort action exist in the lending setting?
While borrowers' and lenders' attorneys debate this issue inside and
outside the courtroom, appellate courts will continue to evade answering
the question until the California Supreme Court speaks the final word.
This Note offers a solution that addresses the concerns of lenders, bor-
rowers, and society as a whole in attempting to align the interests of the
parties to the loan agreement.
Part I surveys the nature of tortious breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in general, the Foley court's analysis of the tort, and
6. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 685, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
7. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
8. Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 732, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
(Vol. 41THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
FOLEY AND LENDER LIABILITY
the development of the tort in lender liability cases. Part II criticizes
lender liability cases for lacking guidelines, argues" that Foley provides the
necessary guidelines, and attempts to show under what circumstances the
tort should be allowed in the lending context. Finally, Part III proposes
a cap on tort damages in the context of lender liability. Such a solution
will maintain economic stability and achieve the goals of tort and con-
tract law.
I. The History of Tortious Breach of the Covenant
Applications of tortious breach of the covenant vary with the types
of contractual settings. In each setting, the determinative factor is the
relationship between the parties, specifically the characteristics of the re-
lationship distinguishing the transaction from the ordinary arms length
commercial transaction for which contract damages are an adequate
remedy.
This Part discusses the origin of the tort in the insurance context
and its gradual expansion to other commercial contract settings. The
discussion then focuses on the California Supreme Court's analysis of the
tort in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 9 an employment termination case.
Finally, this Part examines the trends regarding tort claims in lender lia-
bility cases before and after the Foley decision.
A. The Nature of the Tort in General
The covenant is a contract term, inherent in every contract, that
imposes on each party to the contract a duty to refrain from doing any-
thing that will deprive the other party of the "benefits" of the contract. 10
The obligation to deal in good faith is codified in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code." Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
states that "[e]very contract... [to which the U.C.C. applies] imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. sec-
tion 1-201(19) defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."
Like the breach of any other contract term, breach of the covenant
gives rise to actions for contract damages. Although it is fundamental
that a breach of contract is not a tort,12 breach of the covenant in certain
contractual settings has given rise to an action for tort damages.1 3 In
9. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, (1988).
10. Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200
(1958) (citing Brown v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949)).
11. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989) (obligation to perform in good faith); id § 1-201(19) (defi-
nition of good faith).
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (5th ed. 1984).
13. See, eg., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d
1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (tortious breach in commercial context for bad faith denial of
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those contexts, the nature of the contractual relationship is such that
courts recognize the inadequacy of contract damages to redress the claim
of the injured party, 14 as well as the need to deter the party who would
benefit financially from breaching the contract.' 5
The tort first was recognized in insurance cases when the insurer, in
bad faith, refused to pay the claim of its insured.1 6 Courts justified al-
lowing tort damages for breach of the insurance contract by finding a
"special relationship" between the insurer and the insured. 17 Features of
the relationship making it "special" are the quasi-public nature of the
insurance industry, the insurer's depiction of itself as a fiduciary, the se-
curity seeking motive of the insured as opposed to the commercial motive
of the insurer, and ultimately the superior bargaining position of the
insurer. 181
Gradually courts expanded the tort as they found "special relation-
ships" in other commercial contract settings.19 In 1984, the California
Supreme Court was faced with the question whether to extend the tort to
the commercial context generally.20 In Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co., 21 the court recognized that undoubtedly there are rela-
tionships, other than that between insurer and insured, whose similarity
to the insurer-insured relationship warrants similar legal treatment-re-
covery in tort."' 22 The court avoided naming those relationships, how-
ever, and created a slightly different tort: bad faith denial of contract. 23
contract); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691
(1979) (tortious breach in insurance context), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1985) (tortious breach in banking context); Wallis v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984) (tortious breach in employment context).
14. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
15. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (1979).
16. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 684, 765 P.2d 373, 390, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 228 (1988) ("The insurance cases thus were a major departure from traditional
principles of contract law.") (citing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), as the first time an insured was allowed to recover tort damages for
breach of the covenant).
17. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 620 P.2d at 146, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
18. Id. at 819-20, 620 P.2d at 145-46, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96.
19. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (tortious breach in commercial context for bad faith denial of con-
tract); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1985) (tortious breach in banking context); Wallis v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984) (tortious breach in employment context).
20. See Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 758, 686 P.2d at 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 354 (tortious
breach found for bad faith denial of a dealership contract between dealer and supplier).
21. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
22. Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (footnote omitted).
23. Id., 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Bad faith denial of the existence of a
contract arguably is a breach of the covenant, however, and not a different tort. The action for
bad faith denial is premised upon the existence of a contract. Not performing the terms of the
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The court described this tortious conduct as "seeking to avoid all liability
on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a 'stonewall' position ('see
you in court') without probable cause and with no belief in the existence
of a defense." 24
The Seaman's court held that tort damages are proper in this setting
because such conduct violates "business ethics."'25 Furthermore, the
court determined that potential tort liability will not interfere with the
"bargaining relationship" or adversely affect the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the parties.26
Acting upon the implications of Seaman's, a California court of ap-
peal in Wallis v. Superior Court27 enumerated characteristics of the "spe-
cial relationship" required for tort recovery in cases other than
insurance:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal
bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering the contract must
be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, fu-
ture protection; (3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate be-
cause (a) they do not require the party in the superior position to*
account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party
'whole'; (4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of
harm it may suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to
perform; and (5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability. 28
The Wallis court found that under these circumstances, contract
damages are inadequate to make the injured party whole. Tort damages
are also necessary to discourage this type of bad faith behavior.29 The
Wallis court determined that these circumstances are not limited to in-
surance, but exist in other areas such as employment.30
contract is a breach of contract, the nonperformance of which is a breach. A party denying the
existence of a contract in bad faith clearly is not performing according to the terms of the
contract and therefore has committed a breach in bad faith regardless of whether the denial
gives rise to a separate tort. Hence, there is really no difference between the two torts. If any
difference exists, it seems negligible and certainly not worthy of a separate label. See Putz &
Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for
"Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. RFv. 419, 459 (1987) ("there is no rational way to distinguish
denial of the existence of a contract from any other excuse for denying liability"). Perhaps the
difference that Seaman's recognized can best be explained by its statement that it is tortious to
adopt a "stonewall position" when "in addition to breaching the contract, [a party] seeks to
shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the con-
tract exists" (that is, recognizing a difference between bad faith nonperformance and avoiding
liability in bad faith). Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
24. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
25. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
26. Id.
27. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
28. Id. at 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
29. Id. at 1117-18, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
30. Id. at 1118-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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Until the recent California Supreme Court decision in Foley v. Inter-
active Data Corp., 31 other courts utilized the Wallis factors to determine
whether a breach of the covenant is tortious. These courts found that the
nature of the relationship between the contracting parties was either
"special," in which case the injured party could recover tort damages for
breach of the covenant, or not "special," in which case the injured party
could recover only contract damages. 32
B. The Nature of the Tort According to Foley
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 33 has been described as a dramatic
upset to the evolution of the tortious breach of the covenant. 34 Foley's
employment was terminated after he informed his employer that the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation was investigating Foley's supervisor for em-
bezzlement. 35 Not only did the California Supreme Court deny Foley's
claim for tortious breach of the covenant, but the court also declined to
recognize tortious breach of the covenant in the employment termination
context generally. 36 The Foley court concluded that the employer-em-
ployee relationship is not "sufficiently similar" to the insurer-insured re-
lationship to "warrant judicial extension of the proposed additional tort
remedies" when weighed against the "countervailing concerns about eco-
nomic policy and stability, the traditional separation of tort and contract
law, and finally, the numerous protections against improper terminations
already afforded employees. ' 37
31. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Standard Wire & Cable Co. v. Ameritrust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 368, 373
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (applying California law, district court granted defendant lender's motion for
summary judgment on plaintiff borrower's claims for tortious breach of the covenant because
"the Wallis 5-part test [was] not... satisfied"); Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396,
413-14, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26-27 (1988) ("special relationship" as defined in Wallis was not
found in dealership contract between rental company and rental dealer); Okun v. Morton, 203
Cal. App. 3d 805, 826, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 233 (1988) (court agreed with the holding in Wallis
and adopted its reasoning to find no special relationship between majority partner and minor-
ity partner in partnership agreement); Multiplex Ins. Agency v. California Life Ins. Co., 189
Cal. App. 3d 925, 937, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12, 20 (1987) (trial court committed reversible error by
failing to instruct jury on characteristics of "special relationship" as defined in Wallis in deter-
mining tortious breach of contract between insurance agency and insurance company). But see
Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 164, 192, 254 Cal. Rptr. 645,
660-61 (1988) (declining to apply Wallis criteria, found bad faith employment discharge case
distinguishable from the Wallis breach of "an agreement to provide pension benefits after the
employment relationship had ended").
33. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
34. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 477, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 740
(1989).
35. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 664, 765 P.2d at 375-76, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
36. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
37. Id.
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Unlike the cases preceding and following it, in Foley the court made
no assumptions about expanding the tort outside the insurance area (and
specifically to the employment context). Instead, the court performed an
in-depth analysis of the propriety of tort recovery in the employment
termination context.3 8 The analysis included a criticism of prior cases
for assuming a cause of action existed, a consideration of the varying
approaches of scholars, and a comparison between the employer-em-
ployee relationship and the insurer-insured relationship.3 9
The Foley court described the recognition of the tort in the insur-
ance context as an exception to the general rule that breach of a contract
term gives rise to an action for contract damages but not tort damages.4°
The court then criticized the employment termination cases for placing
employment termination in the exception category without recognizing
that tort recovery lacked precedent in the employment area,41 and with-
out examining insurance and employment relationships to determine
whether the justifications for tort recovery in the insurance context per-
vade the employment context.4 2
38. Compare id. at 682-700, 765 P.2d at 389-401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227-39 (18 full pages
devoted to tortious breach of the covenant) with Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil
Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 767-74, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-70, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362-66 (1984) (seven
full pages devoted to tortious breach of the covenant) and Wallis v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal.
App. 3d 1109, 1115-19, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127-30 (1984) (four full pages devoted to tortious
breach of the covenant) and Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453-56, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 727-30 (1980) (just under four full pages devoted to tortious breach of the
covenant).
39. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 682-700, 765 P.2d at 389-401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227-39.
40. Id at 684, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
41. Id at 687, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230. The Foley court pointed out: "In
only three cases outside of California have courts held that a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing gives rise to tort damages." Id at 686 n.26, 765 P.2d at 391-92 n.26, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 229-30 n.26 (citing Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Il. 1983)
("summarily and without analysis, stat[ing] that tort damages were available for breach of the
covenant in an employment case"); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274,
687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (1984) (finding tort liability for breach of an employment contract's im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732
P.2d 1364 (1987) (employment termination case)).
42. Id. at 685, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29. The problem with the earlier
cases, as the Foley court regarded it, was "the decisions' uncritical incorporation of the insur-
ance model into the employment context, without careful consideration of the fundamental
policies underlying the development of tort and contract law in general or of significant differ-
ences between the insurer/insured and employer/employee relationships." Id. at 689, 765
P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32 (footnote omitted). The Foley court criticized Cleary v.
American Airlines, II Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), for unduly relying on
insurance law without further examination into the propriety of extending tort liability to the
employment context. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 687, 765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230. Foley
then criticized several other employment cases for relying "uncritically" on Cleary. Id. at 688,
765 P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31 (criticizing Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980
(9th Cir. 1988); Koehrer v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986);
Gray v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata
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Foley disregarded earlier cases and consulted the scholarly publica-
tions to determine when tortious breach should be available outside the
insurance context, if at all.43 As courts have been inconsistent in their
tortious breach decisions, so also scholars are divided on expanding the
tort outside the insurance area.44 Some commentators focus on the dis-
tinctions between the employer-employee and insurer-insured relation-
ships to argue that tort recovery should be allowed within the limitations
that define the relationship as "special. '45 These commentators endorse
the use of a "special relationship" test like that in Wallis. They argue
that under certain circumstances, public policy warrants recognition of
the tort remedy in non-insurance cases. The circumstances to which
they refer are those that make the setting similar to insurance:
(1) one of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior bargaining posi-
tion to the extent that it is able to dictate the terms of the contract; (2)
the purpose of the weaker party in entering into the contract is not
primarily to profit but rather to secure an essential service or product,
financial security or peace of mind; (3) the relationship of the parties is
such that the weaker party places its trust and confidence in the larger
entity; and (4) there is conduct on the part of the defendant indicating
an intent to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the contract
rights.
46
Others argue against a "special relationship" test in the employment
context on the basis that employment is not sufficiently analogous even to
Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, 169 Cal. App.
3d 1, 215 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machs., 162 Cal. App.
3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d
467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 361 (1983)).
43. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
44. See id. at 690-92, 765 P.2d at 394-95, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33 (discussing three
distinct approaches); see infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at 690-91, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33 (citing Louderback & Jurika,
Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 187
(1982)).
46. Id. (quoting Louderback & Jurika, supra note 45, at 227 (Louderback and Jurika
argue that although the employer is not technically a fiduciary to the employee, circumstances,
such as a case in which the employer is a large corporate entity, arise in which the employee
has a right to rely on the employer not to breach the employment contract. Louderback &
Jurika, supra note 45, at 222-23. The large corporate employer, maintain Louderback and
Jurika, not only is in a superior bargaining position, but its practices have a potentially adverse
affect on a large percentage of the public. Id. at 223. Notably, they would allow the !ort claim
in the case of a contractual relationship between a "builder-lender" and a "new home buyer."
Id. at 225-26. The builder-lender gains an advantage over the hew home buyer because of its
real estate experience. The lender's experience enables it to dictate the terms of the contract
and the buyer's inexpericnce leads it to rely on the lender to draft a fair contract and not
arbitrarily breach that contract. Id.). Foley noted that these "special relationship" factors
were used by the court in Wallis to conclude "that the employment relationship was analogous
to that of insurer and insured and justified the availability of tort relief." Id. at 691 n.29, 765
P.2d at 395 n.29, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.29.
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recognize the tort, much less to define factors satisfying a claim.47 These
commentators argue that the differences between employment and insur-
ance are the inequality of bargaining power in insurance versus the equal-
ity of bargaining power in employment, the fiduciary status of the
insurer versus the non-fiduciary status of the employer, and the quasi-
public nature of the service the insurer provides versus the private nature
of the service the employer provides.4
Still other commentators argue that the special relationship test is
illusory because there is no adequate way to define the "special relation-
ship" short of a case-by-case determination, which in turn at least re-
quires allowing the injured to bring a tort claim.49 Furthermore, they
label the special relationship test a failure because it does not explain the
justifications for tort liability.50
The Foley court agreed with the approach of Miller and Estes,51 re-
jecting an extension of the tort even to employment termination cases
with similarities to insurance cases. 52 The court was not convinced that
the relationship between employer and employee was "special" enough
to warrant allowing an employee to sue for tort damages when the em-
ployer terminates in bad faith.53
The court held that fundamental differences between employment
and insurance- preclude an extension of the tort to employment termina-
tion cases because insurance relationship characteristics generally are not
found in the employment relationship.54 Specifically, the Foley court
found differences between insurance and employment in three fundamen-
47. Id. at 691, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (citing Miller & Estes, Recent
Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
65, 90-91 (1982); Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv.
153, 165-67 (1981) (authored by Brian F. Berger)).
48. Id., 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (citing Miller & Estes, supra note 47, at 91;
and Note, supra note 47, at 165-67).
49. Id. at 691-92, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (quoting Putz & Klippen, supra
note 22, at 478-80).
50. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (quoting Note, Reconstructing
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1291, 1299 (1985) (authored by Michael H. Cohen). The test failed in four respects:
(1) it does not explain why it "justifies tort liability" for otherwise legal conduct, or
for conduct which may give rise to contract remedies, (2) use of the concept "is
inadequate to define the scope and application of a tort duty of good faith and fair
dealing," (3) use of the model "fails to distinguish between breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and "bad faith breach of contract," and (4)
the model does not provide justification for imposition of punitive damages and thus
"might serve to unfairly chill legitimate conduct."
Id. (quoting Note, supra, at 1299-1301) (citation omitted).
51. See Miller & Estes, supra note 46 (argument against special relationship test because
of the lack of similarities between insurance and employment).
52. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
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tal areas: the economic dilemma suffered by the injured upon breach of
the contract, the quasi-public-service nature of the field, and the align-
ment of interests between the parties to the contract. 5 These differences
were sufficient to tip the scale in favor of disallowing the tort.
The court determined that the insured faces great economic difficul-
ties when the insurer breaches the insurance contract by refusing to sat-
isfy a claim. The insured has nowhere to turn; no other insurance
company will provide relief funds once the damage has occurred. After
having foregone opportunities to contract with other insurance compa-
nies, the insured cannot now resort to the marketplace. Thus, the breach
leaves the insured with an economic dilemma.5 6 The employee who is
fired arbitrarily does not suffer the same economic dilemma. The em-
ployee can and must go to the marketplace and make a reasonable at-
tempt to secure other employment.- 7 Although the employee may have
difficulty in landing a new job, the difficulty does not arise directly as a
result of the employee having foregone other employment opportunities
upon employment with the defendant.
The second fundamental difference is the quasi-public-service nature
of the insurance industry as opposed to the private nature of the employ-
ment industry.5 8 The insurer sells protection from potential economic
harm to the individual who is seeking financial security, not profit; the
employer is "selling" a job and not financial security. Likewise, the em-
ployee is not purchasing a type of financial security distinguishable from
that sought by anyone entering a typical commercial contract.5 9
The third fundamental difference is the alignment of the contracting
parties' interests in breaching or not breaching the contract. 60 If the in-
terests are at odds, the party in whose interest it would be to breach must
be discouraged from breaching to protect the integrity of the contract. 61
Of course, a disincentive is not necessary when neither party would find
it economically appealing to breach the contract. When the insurer's
duty to pay the insured is triggered by the occurrence of an event against
which insurance was sought, the interests of the insurer and insured are
"financially at odds": payment siphons the insurer's funds and replen-
ishes the insured's. Money is transferred from the insurer to the insured
55. Id., 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
56. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
57. Id., 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (citing Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The
Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 201, 208 (1985)). The require-
ment that the employee try to find another job arises from her duty to mitigate damages. Id.
(citing Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181-82, 474 P.2d 689, 692,
89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970)).
58. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
61. See id.
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only if the particular claim is paid.62 In the employment context, how-
ever, "[i]f there is a job to be done, the employer must pay someone to do
it." ' 63 Therefore, the interests usually are aligned because of the mutual
economic benefit of continued employment."
In balancing considerations for and against allowing the tort, the
Foley court determined that the concerns for "economic policy and sta-
bility," the desire to maintain the "traditional separation of tort and con-
tract law," and the "numerous [statutory] protections against improper
terminations already afforded employees," add further weight to the dis-
" allowance of the tort.65
The concern for economic policy and stability is based on the pre-
dictability of costs in contractual relationships and the lack of predict-
ability in tort awards.66 If contract damages are the only available relief
for breach of contract, the contracting parties know the extent of their
financial obligation when they enter the agreement because contract
damages are limited by foreseeability. 67 But if tort damages are extended
to the contractual setting, then the contracting parties do not know their
maximum financial obligation because foreseeability is irrelevant in
tort. 68 The potential for enormous tort damages will discourage parties
from contracting. Consequently, the party that is most likely to be held
liable for large tort awards will alleviate the added burden by shifting the
costs to the consumer and by becoming more selective in choosing the
parties with whom it will enter into contracts. Thus, potential tort dam-
ages threaten economic stability.69
A second countervailing concern, the desire to keep tort and con-
tract law separate, derives from the distinct purposes served by contract
and tort remedies:70 contract damages compensate, while tort damages
work to deter as well as compensate.71 Contract law is designed to en-
force party intentions, but tort law is designed to vindicate social
policy. 72
62. Id.
63. Id If there is not a "job to be done," then the employer may usually discharge the
employee in good faith. See Respondent's Brief at 56, Foley v. Interactive Data, 47 Cal. 3d
654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (No. LA32418).
64. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
65. Id at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
66. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (citing Putz & Klippen, supra note
23, at 432).
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (Deering 1984).
68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (Deering 1984); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 133 (1988).
69. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 695-96, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
70. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The social policy furthered by tort damages is the careful avoidance
of harming others.73 Society is neutral, however, toward injury from
contract breach. 74  Efficient breach theorists even argue that society
would welcome an economically efficient contract breach because the
economic benefit to the breaching party would exceed the loss to the in-
jured party, thus "promot[ing] the efficient allocation of resources and
benefit[ting] society as a whole."'75
A third concern adding strength to arguments for disallowing the
tort is the availability of statutory protections against bad faith employ-
ment termination. 76 Labor laws provide relief for discriminatory dis-
charges based on age, sex, race, and religion, as well as the exercise of
rights under workers' compensation laws and participation in union
activities.77
The Foley court's discussion, however, was not yet finished. The
court recognized that contract damages are inadequate to compensate
and deter the potential injury caused by some unwarranted discharges. 78
The issue to be addressed was "how far courts can or should go in re-
sponding to these concerns regarding the sufficiency of compensation by
departing from long established principles of contract laws."' 79 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court answered this question by deciding that the prob-
73. Putz & Klippen, supra note 23, at 430.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 430-31 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93-95, 105-15 (3d ed.
1986)). See also Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947,
948 (1982). Macneil provides the following example to illustrate the efficient breach theory:
Assume that Athos owns a woodworking factory capable of taking on one more
major project. He contracts to supply Porthos with 100,000 chairs at $10 per chair,
which will bring Athos a net profit of $2 per chair, or $200,000 on the contract.
Before any work takes place, Aramis, who sells tables, approaches Athos. Although
there are several chair factories in the area, only Athos's factory can make tables. If
Athos will supply Aramis with 50,000 tables, Aramis will pay him $40 per table.
Athos can produce the tables for $25, so he can make a profit of $750,000 if he uses
his factory for Aramis's tables. But to do so, he must breach his contract with
Porthos. There are other chair factories, and Porthos will be able to get the chairs
from one of them-for example, from D'Artagnan's. Let us assume that because of
his distress situation Porthos will have to pay D'Artagnan 20% more than Athos's
price for comparable chairs, and that Porthos will sustain $100,000 in incidental ad-
ministrative costs and consequential costs such as damages for delay to his custom-
ers. Even with these costs, Porthos will lose only $300,000 because of Athos's
breach, and Athos can reimburse him in full and still make $450,000 profit, over
twice the profit from his contract with Porthos.
Id. (quoting Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity and the Sec-
ond Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 114-15 (1981)).
76. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693 n.30, 765 P.2d at 396 n.30, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.30.
77. Id. Additionally, the employee may bring a tort claim for breach of public policy.
Id.
78. Id., 765 P.2d at 396-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
79. Id. at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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lem is better left to the legislature, and thus courts should not grant any
relief beyond contractual remedies.80 The court foresaw economic and
judicial chaos if it assumed the role of granting remedies outside the
realm of contract law for breach of contract.
C. The Nature of the Tort in Lender Liability Cases
Foley marks a change in the trend of lender liability cases. In pre-
Foley cases, courts first assumed that tort recovery was available and
then proceeded to weigh Wallis-type factors81 to determine if the lender
and borrower enjoyed a "special relationship." Courts awarded tort
damages only if they found this "special relationship" between the par-
ties. 82 Lender liability cases after Foley have questioned the very exist-
ence of the tort.83 These cases, however, have not resolved the issue and
have continued to utilize the Wallis test.84 The attitude toward the tort
seems to have changed since the Foley decision, but the application of the
tort has remained the same. The status quo likely Will remain until the
California Supreme Court explicitly addresses the issue.
L The Pre-Foley Cases
Early lender liability cases focused on public policy considerations
in determining whether the facts gave rise to tort damages.85 Although
there was no tortious breach under the particular facts, the court in Wag-
ner v. Benson 86 assumed, without deciding, that a bad faith claim may be
based on a borrower-lender relationship.8 7 The tort had not yet been
extended beyond insurance, but the Wagner court found no reason to
80. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Standard Wire & Cable Co. v. Ameritrust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 368 (C.D.
Cal. 1988) (purportedly applying California "law" by applying the special relationship test).
83. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 477-78, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 740-41
(1989); see also Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 730, 260 Cal. Rptr.
793, 795 (1989) ("Foley may leave this question open").
84. See Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741; Mitsui, 212 Cal. App. 3d at
733, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
85. See Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980)
("Since tort liability is ultimately imposed to achieve a desirable social climate, 'public policy'
plays a major role in determining the standard of conduct required by a particular factual
situation.") (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 15-16 (4th ed.
1971).
86. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
87. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520. In Wagner, the bank and borrowers (individuals)
agreed that if the outstanding loan amount rose above 75% of the periodically calculated value
of the collateral (a cattle herd), the bank could require the borrowers to pay the necessary
amount to decrease the loan amount to the 75% margin. Cattle prices dropped significantly
and the borrowers refused to pay the second of two margin calls. Consequently, the bank
forced a sale of the cattle to pay the balance of the loan. Id. at 31, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 519. The
borrowers unsuccessfully sued for breach of the covenant. Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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limit the tort to the insurance context. Instead, the court said that the
decision to extend the tort should be made after considering issues of
public policy. 88 Wagner thus recognized that in certain situations public
policy would dictate imposing tort damages on a lender whose breach of
the lending agreement threatened the ideal social environment.8 9
Another early case, Sawyer v. Bank of America,90 described the tort
as "consist[ing] in bad faith action, extraneous to the contract, with the
motive intentionally to frustrate the obligee's enjoyment of contract
rights." 91 The Sawyer court, however, held that under the facts of the
case, the plaintiff did not sustain his cause of action for breach of the
covenant.92
The plaintiff, a farmer and customer of the defendant bank for sev-
eral years, purchased a truck and financed the purchase through the de-
fendant. The dealer prepared a security agreement providing that the
seller would obtain insurance if the buyer did not. The security agree-
ment then was assigned to the bank. As had been his practice in the past
with this bank, the plaintiff did not apply for insurance, but instead relied
on the bank to maintain the insurance coverage. This had been the pro-
cedure followed for at least four vehicles purchased by the plaintiff and
financed by the defendant. Due to a clerical error the bank let the policy
expire. A subsequent fire damaged the plaintiff's truck; but because of
the expired insurance policy, he was unable to collect any repair money
from the insurance company. The bank also refused to pay for the
repairs.93
The plaintiff successfully sued for the breach of the bank's contract
obligation to obtain and maintain insurance on the truck.94 The Sawyer
court, however, held that the plaintiff could not recover general damages
for emotional distress. The court could find no authority to support tort
liability based solely on the lender's refusal to admit contract liability. 95
To sustain the cause of action, therefore, the plaintiff would have to show
that the breach itself-failure to maintain insurance-was in bad faith.96
88. Id. at 33-34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
89. See id. The Wagner court held that the bank's practices "d[id] not violate social
standards of fair dealing" because the scope of the duty imposed by the covenant extends only
to the "benefits of the agreement." Id. at 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521. A good investment in
cattle was not a "benefit" of the contract; therefore, there was no breach. Id.
90. 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
91. Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (citing Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club v. City of
Berkeley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 280, 286, 116 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (1974); Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal.
2d 567, 589, 349 P.2d 289, 300, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609, 620 (1960)).
92. Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26.
93. Id. at 138, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 139, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
96. See id., 145 Cal. Rptr. at 625-26. But cf Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769-70, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984) (holding
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One of the first lender liability cases actually to compare the bank-
customer relationship to an insurance relationship is Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United California Bank 97 Although it involved a depositor rather
than a borrower, Commercial Cotton has been cited as support for ex-
tending the tort to the bank-customer relationship.98
In Commercial Cotton, the court held the defendant bank liable for
tort damages for debiting a commercial checking account on a check
containing unauthorized signatures. 99 The court based its decision on
the similarities between banking and insurance. The court found that
both were "highly regulated industries performing vital public services
substantially affecting the public welfare." 10° As a result, the depositor is
"totally dependent on... the bank's honesty and expertise." 101
The court also recognized the similarities in the motive of the bank
and the insurer. Like the insurer, the bank has the "very commercial
purpose of making money by using the deposited funds."' 1 2 This motive
often conflicts with the security seeking motive of the depositor and the
that "a party to a contract may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the con-
tract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause,
that the contract exists").
97. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
98. See, eg., Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16,
20 (1986) (following the holding in Commercial Cotton and finding a fiduciary relationship
between the personal guarantors of a loan and the lending bank).
The Barrett plaintiffs, personal guarantors of a loan, were principal shareholders in a
small corporation. The continuing personal guarantees were secured by trust deeds on two
houses, one of which was the plaintiffs' personal residence. Upon notice from the bank that
because of losses the corporation was not in the required financial position, the plaintiffs, rely-
ing on the financial advice of defendant's officer, agreed to merge their corporation with an-
other. The advising officer allegedly assured the plaintiffs that the merging corporation would
be responsible for the loans and that their personal guarantees would be released by the bank.
The personal guarantees, however, were not released. The merging corporation filed bank-
ruptcy and foreclosure proceedings were initiated against plaintiffs' personal residence. The
plaintiffs sold their home and were forced to give up the proceeds of the sale. Id. at 1365-66,
229 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
Although the plaintiffs did not bring an action for tortious breach of the covenant, they
did prevail on a fraud claim, which is more difficult to sustain. Not only did the court find a
special relationship between the bank and the personal guarantors, but it also found facts suffi-
cient to create a fiduciary relationship between the two parties. Id. at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at
20-21.
The court based its finding of such a relationship on the plaintiffs' perception that their
relationship with the bank officer was "very close," on their reliance on the officer's financial
advice, on their disclosure of confidential information with respect to the financial status of the
corporation, and on the bank's potential gain from the merger. Id at 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. at
20-21.
99. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 513-14, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
100. Id at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
101. Id
102. Id.
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insured. The court concluded that the bank and its depositor share at
least a "quasi-fiduciary relationship."'10 3
Also focusing on the relationship between the parties, a federal dis-
trict court applying California law in Standard Wire & Cable Co. v.
Ameritrust Corp. 104 assumed that in California, tortious breach may be
alleged under the Wallis "special relationship theory."10 5 The plaintiff, a
closely held corporation, alleged that the defendant credit corporation
orally agreed to lend it funds but later rejected the previously accepted
security and refused to deliver the funds. 106 The court held that the spe-
cial relationship test failed because the parties entered into the transac-
tion at arms length, and their sole motive was to increase profitability. 107
Thus, contract damages were sufficient to compensate the plaintiff. 10 8
A more recent pre-Foley case, Kruse v. Bank ofAmerica, 109 also held
that the tort cause of action exists, but that the facts did not support the
claim. 110 The Kruse case arose from a complicated series of related loan
transactions.II" Cross-complainants, the Jewells, claimed that the bank
had wrongfully induced them to borrow large amounts to keep an apple
processing company from failing. The cross-complaint alleged "that
once the Jewells were hopelessly overextended, the Bank reneged on its
promise to provide long-term financing"'1 12 which would have kept the
company and the Jewells from declaring bankruptcy. In addition, after
the bank obtained the Jewells' assets, the bank "betrayed" the Jewells by
not following through with its promise to pay the Jewells' other credi-
tors." 3 The Jewells claimed that their bankruptcy and emotional dis-
tress directly resulted from the bank's actions, which were contrary to its
repeated assurances that it would extend funds and take care of the
Jewells. 114
The Kruse court held that the facts did not support the Jewells'
claim for bad faith denial of contract. 115 The court reasoned that the tort
claim may only arise when the party not only breaches the contract but
also denies in bad faith that an enforceable contract exists. 116 There was
no enforceable oral or written contract between the bank and the Jewells
103. Id.
104. 697 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
105. Id. at 373.
106. Id. at 371.
107. Id. at 373.
108. Id.
109. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
110. Id. at 60, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
111. Id. at 44-51, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 219-24.
112. Id. at 52, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
113. Id. at 52, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24.
114. Id. at 49-51, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
115. Id. at 60, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
116. Id. at 57, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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for the long-term loan; therefore, the court found that the precondition
to the tort claim was not satisfied and the facts did not state a claim for
bad faith denial of contract.' 17
The Kruse court did not actually say that there can never be a tort
claim in this setting. The court seemed to recognize that a tortious
breach of the covenant by bad faith denial of contract is actionable in the
lender-borrower setting. 18
This recognition of the tort coupled with a finding of insufficient
evidence to support the tort claim is a theme running throughout the pre-
Foley lender liability cases. Public policy considerations and special rela-
tionships present justifications for allowing tort claims in the pre-Foley
cases. In none of the cases, however, did the court perform critical anal-
yses of the lending industry and lender-borrower relationships to deter-
mine under what circumstances the tort would be warranted.
2. The Post-Foley Cases
The pre-Foley theme of recognition of the tort but denial of the
claim persists in the post-Foley cases. Unlike the pre-Foley cases, how-
ever, two post-Foley cases have questioned the existence of the tort in the
lender-borrower setting. 119 Once the question is posed, the post-Foley
cases retreat and resort to the same standards as applied in the pre-Foley
cases.
In Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court, 120 the defendants,
a borrowing corporation and personal guarantors of short-term notes,
cross-complained that the plaintiff bank tortiously breached the covenant
by refusing to honor its promise to extend credit on short-term notes
until the corporation could obtain long-term financing.' 2 ' The court
held that the cross-complainants alleged no facts to differentiate the par-
ticular transaction from the "ordinary arms-length commercial transac-
tion" for which "ordinary contract damages" are adequate.122
The Mitsui court admitted that Foley left open the possibility of ex-
tending the tort to the lender-borrower setting. The court, however, pre-
dicted that the California Supreme Court would not extend the tort to
117. Id. at 58, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
118. See id. at 60, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
119. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 741
(1989) (implying that tortious breach of the covenant is not a firmly established legal theory);
Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 730, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793, 795 (1989)
("While Foley may leave this question open, albeit narrowly," the California Supreme Court
"would not permit such an action" in the ordinary lender liability setting.).
120. 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1989).
121. Id. at 728-29, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
122. Id. at 731, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
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the "ordinary" situation in which a lender breaks its promise to extend
short-term loans. 12 3
Mitsui rejected the notion that a bank may tortiously breach any
contract that it enters into. 124 Instead the court emphasized that the na-
ture of the contract is critical, listing the Wallis factors as determina-
tive. 12 5 The Mitsui court did not define the tort further, but merely
discussed why the parties were in equal bargaining positions.' 26
Another recent case, Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 127 based its holding
on Wallis and left unanswered the impact of Foley on lending. In Price,
the borrowers sued Wells Fargo Bank for tortious breach of the cove-
nant. On February 28, 1983, Wells Fargo and the borrowers entered into
three loan agreements secured by the borrowers' ranch property. The
loans were to enable the borrowers to pay off a loan with Crocker Bank.
Although the parties had negotiated that the loans would be repaid over
five years, the promissory notes stated maturity dates within one year.
The bank official allegedly reassured the protesting borrowers that the
loans would be "redone" to reflect the five-year plan. 128
The borrowers made several interest payments on the three loans,
but did not pay the balance of the principal on the erroneous maturity
date. Nearly one month later the bank notified the borrowers that the
loans were past due. Although the borrowers attempted to negotiate re-
structuring the loans to reflect the parties' initial understandings, Wells
Fargo refused and threatened foreclosure.129
The parties finally agreed to a revised payment schedule, which the
borrowers proved unable to keep. After further unsuccessful negotia-
tions, the borrowers resorted to borrowing from friends and selling vari-
ous real and personal property to pay off the loan two and one-half years
sooner than the original agreement provided. 130
123. Id. at 730, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
124. Id. at 731, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
125. Id. The "significant factors" include
unequal bargaining strength between the parties, an inadequacy of ordinary contract
damages or other remedies, adhesiveness of contract provisions adversely impacting
the damaged party which are either neutral toward or benefit the other, public con-
cerns that parties to certain types of contracts conduct themselves in a particular
manner, the reasonable expectations of the parties or a fiduciary relationship in
which the financial dependence or personal security by the damaged party has been
entrusted to the other.
Id.
126. See id. at 731-32, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97 (the parties were in equal bargaining posi-
tions because there was no "commercial 'uniqueness' " in the arrangement between the bank
and the company, because in the past the parties had dealt fairly with each other, and because
the borrower could have chosen not to accept the long-term financing from the bank).
127. 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989).
128. Id. at 471-72, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37.
129. Id. at 472, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
130. Id. at 473-74, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38.
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The Price court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Wells
Fargo. 131 The court concluded that the borrowers' allegations that they
were banking customers and beneficiaries of a fiduciary relationship with
defendant, together with an explanation of the loan transactions, were
not sufficient to state a tort claim.132 The court stated that the plaintiffs
did not argue that these allegations passed "the rigorous five-part test of
the Wallis decision." 133 Furthermore, the court found that tort liability
could not be found under Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil
Co. 134 because there was no separate pleading of bad faith denial of con-
tract. According to Price, this tort is distinct from the tortious breach of
the covenant. 135
The court, in dicta, criticized both Commercial Cotton, which found
a quasi-fiduciary relationship between bank and depositor,136 and Bar-
rett, which found a quasi-fiduciary relationship between bank and loan
customer, 137 as "inconsistent with both past authority and current trends
in the law." 138
The Price court also suggested that although Foley's impact cannot
be determined with complete certainty, Foley might stunt the growth of
tort claims in the lender liability setting:
[U]ntil the Supreme Court says otherwise, it may still be argued that a
noninsurance contract was "tortiously breached if it contained charac-
teristics similar to those which allow a finding of tortious breach in an
insurance contract."... But the implications of [Foley's] analysis pre-
sage a close scrutiny of tort recovery for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing outside of the insurance context. 139
131. Id. at 487, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
132. Id. at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
133. Id.
134. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d
1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984) (finding tortious the bad faith denial of the exist-
ence of a contract).
135. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (citing Kruse v. Bank of
America, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 57-60, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 228-30 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 870 (1989)). But see supra note 23 (arguing that there is no real difference between the
Seaman's tort and tortious breach of the covenant; therefore, there is no need to plead separate
causes of action).
136. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 98.
138. Price, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (footnote omitted). The court
found that previous cases characterized both the relationships of bank and depositor, and bank
and loan customer as debtor-creditor, which, "under ordinary circumstances," is not a fiduci-
ary relationship. Id. at 476-77, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 740 (quoting Lawrence v. Bank of America,
163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 437, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1985); citing Morse v. Crocker Nat'l
Bank, 142 Cal. App. 3d 228, 232, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1983); Downey v. Humphreys, 102
Cal. App. 2d 323, 332, 227 P.2d 484, 490 (1951)). The court then described Foley and Mitsui
as moving away from expansion of the tort. Id. at 477-78, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 740-41.
139. Id. at 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (citing Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal.
App. 3d 726, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1989)). The court, in dicta, stated that Foley impliedly
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In summary, a post-Foley trend is developing as a variation on the
previous theme that recognized the tort but denied the claim. Courts
addressing the issue have realized that Foley plays a significant role in
defining the application of the tort to lender liability cases, but have not
explained Foley's role. Instead they have returned to the pre-Foley
theme of applying the Wallis factors and denying the claims for insuffi-
cient evidence.
II. Foley as Justification for Allowing the Tort in Lender
Liability Cases
The persistent theme of recognizing the tort in lender liability cases
but denying the tort claims is disturbing. Why allow the tort if it is never
proven under the facts? This Part argues that the denial of tort claims
results from the failure of courts faced with lender liability cases to ex-
amine critically the characteristics that distinguish a loan agreement
from the ordinary commercial arms length transaction.
The Foley opinion includes an in-depth analysis of tortious breach of
the covenant. This Part attempts to use the Foley court's reasoning to
frame a general rule applicable in commercial contexts other than em-
ployment termination, particularly commercial lending. The rule, a bal-
ancing test, then is applied to the lender-borrower relationship. This
Part concludes that there are certain situations in which tort damages are
necessary to provide adequate relief to injured borrowers and discourage
lenders from arbitrarily breaching the loan agreement. Unlimited tort
damages, however, arguably pose as significant a threat to economic sta-
bility as preclusion of tort damages. This Part, therefore, lays the
groundwork for a proposal to maintain economic stability while address-
ing the concerns of both lenders and borrowers.
A. The Need for a Well-Defined Rule
The lender liability cases do not address the tort in the lending con-
text satisfactorily. Although the covenant is described as a basis for
holding the lender liable, the cases do not elaborate on the requisite be-
havior to uphold the covenant.140 In most lender liability cases, courts
assume that the Wallis factors can be found in the lender-borrower rela-
tionship but hold that the facts of the case do not support the tort claim
in that situation. These unsupported tort claims raise the question
whether there ever can be a lender-borrower relationship that is not an
ordinary arms-length transaction, or whether there is a need for the tort
overruled Commercial Cotton's finding that tortious breach is founded on a quasi-fiduciary
relationship between the contracting parties. Id.
140. Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern Form? 11 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 641, 674 (1986).
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in the lending context. Purposefully or not, courts have evaded this
question through their blind acceptance of the Wallis special relationship
test.
Now that the California Supreme Court has determined in Foley
that insurance is an "exception to the rule," courts should scrutinize any
extension of the tort beyond insurance.141 The Wallis contractual rela-
tionship involved employment; therefore, its holding may be questionable
under Foley because the Foley court was not generally convinced that a
special relationship exists between the employer and the employee.1 42
Moreover the inquiry called for in Wallis may not be appropriate for
determining whether the tort exists in any situation after Foley. The
Wallis test begins by assuming the tort may exist in a given relationship
and then considers whether the tort exists in the particular fact situa-
tion.1 43 Foley seems to prohibit assuming the tort exists in any relation-
ship other than the insurer-insured relationship. After Foley, therefore,
the initial inquiry is whether the tort can exist in a particular relation-
ship, not whether the tort is found given certain facts.
The Wallis test was not designed for and may not be suited to this
new purpose. The Foley court mentioned Wallis almost indifferently in a
footnote to its statement that the proponents of a special relationship test
assume that the tort should be recognized in the context of employment
relationships. 144 Thus the Foley court did not place great weight upon
the Wallis special relationship test in determining whether and under
what circumstances the tort should be extended beyond insurance.145
And not surprisingly, most lender liability cases have found that the bor-
rower did not satisfy the five-part Wallis test.146
A continued lack of judicial standards will injure both the lender
and the borrower. Without definite boundaries, a sympathetic jury could
expand the tort beyond its intended scope, which would discourage lend-
ers from contracting with "high-risk borrowers." 47 Ambiguous stan-
141. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 689, 765 P.2d 373, 393, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 231-32 (1988) (criticizing prior employment cases for not carefully analyzing
whether the tort should be extended to the employment termination context).
142. See id at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35 (the employer-employee
relationship is not sufficiently similar to the insurer-insured relationship to warrant an exten-
sion of the tort). See also Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 735, 741 (1989) (predicting that given the opportunity, the California Supreme Court
would overrule Wallis, but nonetheless applying the Wallis test).
143. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1118.
144. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 691 n.29, 765 P.2d at 395 n.29, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.29.
145. See id. at 682-700, 765 P.2d at 389-401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227-39 (using 18 full pages
without following Wallis in analyzing the tort).
146. Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 741
(1989). See also Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 733, 260 Cal. Rptr.
793, 797 (1989) (the "critical" Wallis factors were not met).
147. Note, Bad Faith Lenders, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 417, 441 (1989).
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dards also could be injurious to the borrower. Without "straightforward
instructions concerning trust, confidence, bargaining power and the
like," juries may deny tort relief to the borrower arbitrarily. 148 A well-
defined rule, however, may achieve proper adjudication of lender liability
cases and may serve as a warning mechanism to lenders with respect to
what behavior society expects in lending transactions.
B. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.: The Framework for a Well-Defined Rule
Foley provides the California Supreme Court's most recent in-depth
analysis of the covenant. Unlike Wallis and other prior cases, which
based their findings on assumptions that the special relationship exists in
any contractual relationship, the Foley court made no such assumptions.
Foley made extensive comparisons between employment relationships
and insurance relationships, concluding that there is generally no special
relationship between the employer and employee that gives rise to an
action in tort for breach of the covenant.' 49 The question is, can the
Foley court's reasoning be used to determine if and to what extent the
tort should be allowed in lender liability cases?
The Foley court implied that its decision would have a tremendous
impact on the business community as a whole.' 50 The supreme court
realized that other courts would use its analysis in other commercial con-
texts. Nevertheless, Foley added the qualification that its judgment was
limited to the employment termination context.'15 This realization of the
decision's potential coupled with a qualification on the scope of the judg-
ment suggests that the Foley court contemplated that its analysis could
lead to different results in other factual settings.
Lender liability and banking cases after Foley have submitted that
Foley affects the tort's availability in other types of relationships.
52
148. See Dorsaneo, Other Contractual Relationships, 3 BAD FAITH L. UPDATE 106 (1988)
(arguing against categorizing relationships because it could "arbitrarily exclude" some situa-
tions in which there was a special relationship, and instead arguing in favor of submitting the
question whether there is a special relationship between the contracting parties to the trier of
fact).
149. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 682-700, 765 P.2d 373, 389-401,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227-39 (1988) (criticizing employment cases, distinguishing between tort
and contract law, consulting commentaries' views on the special relationship test, comparing
employment and insurance, and discussing countervailing concerns that add strength to disal-
lowing the tort in employment termination cases).
150. See id. at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235 ("[s]ignificant policy judgments
affecting social policies and commercial relationships are implicated in the resolution of this
question").
151. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
152. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 741
(1989) (stating that Foley's impact "cannot be assessed with certainty" and following Wallis
since Foley (i.e. the California Supreme Court) did not expressly overrule it); Mitsui Mfrs.
Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 730, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793, 795 (1989) (while Foley
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category of transactions and places it in the category of transactions that
deserve protection from a bad faith breach through tort liability.157
C. Applying Foley's Balancing Test to Lender Liability
Comparing the lender-borrower relationship to the insurer-insured
and employer-employee relationships shows that the argument for al-
lowing the tort in the lending liability cases is stronger than in the Foley
employment termination case. A point-by-point comparison of the eco-
nomic dilemma, nature of service, and adversity of interests in these rela-
tionships is illuminating.
When the insurer refuses to pay the insured's claim, the insured suf-
fers great economic hardship. When the employer fires the employee,
however, the employee can turn to the market.1 58 The employee also
may seek aid from the state, further easing reentry into the job market.1 59
No hypothetical situations need be posed to illustrate that borrowers
are faced with great barriers in attempting to return to the market.
When the lender breaches the lending agreement, like the insured the
borrower has nowhere to turn. The borrower also cannot resort to a
comparable state insurance system as an employee can. The facts of the
lender liability cases are exemplary: most borrowers must resort to bank-
ruptcy.16°. Even if the borrower avoids bankruptcy, the borrower's
credit rating will have been destroyed. And even if the credit rating is
intact, the borrower will have no collateral to secure a new loan since
substantially all the borrower's assets will have been liquidated.1 61
157. Id.
158. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
159. The respondent in Foley noted that the employee may resort to the California Unem-
ployment Insurance system, which provides "considerable temporary relief to those who have
lost their employment for any reason except misconduct." Respondent's Brief at 55, Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (No.
LA32418).
160. See, eg., Standard Wire & Cable Co. v. Ameritrust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 368, 371
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (bankruptcy); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 474, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 735, 738 (1989) (borrowers forced to sell bee hives, trucks, cattle, and land for distressed
prices); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Ct., 212 Cal. App. 3d 726, 728-29, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793,
794 (1989) (enforcement of continuing guarantees and foreclosure of security interest); Kruse
v. Bank of America, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 49-51, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 223-24 (1988) (foreclosure
on properties, bankruptcy of individuals and company), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989);
Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1365-66, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1986)
(foreclosure proceedings initiated; plaintiffs sold home to prevent total loss; bank demanded
proceeds of sale); Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 31, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 519 (1980)
(foreclosure on the cattle that plaintiffs had purchased in their investment in a cattle raising
program).
161. See Hunt v. United Bank & Trust Co., 210 Cal. 108, 117, 291 P. 184, 188 (1930)
("Because of [the bank's] unjustified act in refusing to advance the money which defendant
[bank] had obligated itself to do, plaintiffs were in no position to acquire the necessary funds,
for they were at the end of their financial resources.").
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These post-Foley cases, however, have left the precise impact for the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court to decide.
When the California Supreme Court is faced with a tort claim in-
volving a lending transaction, the court's analysis should parallel that in
Foley. In Foley, the court determined that the tort should not be ex-
tended to employment termination cases because the employer-employee
relationship does not have the special characteristics that the insurer-
insured relationship has. 153 Likewise, the court should examine whether
the lender-borrower relationship is sufficiently similar to the insurer-in-
sured relationship to justify tort damages for breach of the covenant.
The question then arises whether the results under the Foley analysis
will be the same in the lender liability case as in an employment termina-
tion case: will the tort claim similarly fail? Applying the Foley court's
reasoning to the lender-borrower setting actually should yield a result
contrary to the holding in Foley.
The Foley analysis is a balancing test. On one side of the scale is
allowance of the tort in the particular setting. This side is strengthened
by the similarity of the particular relationship to the insurer-insured rela-
tionship. As the similarity between the relationships increases, the
strength of the argument for allowing the tort increases. The similarity
of the relationships is determined by comparing the relationship to the
insurer-insured relationship in three areas: the economic difficulties suf-
fered as a result of the breach, the nature of the service provided by the
breaching party, and the alignment or adversity of the interests of the
parties. 154
On the other side of the scale is the disallowance of the tort. This
side is strengthened by a preference for maintaining the traditional sepa-
ration of tort and contract, the policy concern for maintaining a stable
economic environment, and the adequacy of the statutory protections al-
ready afforded the injured party. 155
The relationship will be sufficiently similar to outweigh these oppos-
ing concerns if the factors of economic dilemma, nature of the service,
and adversity of interests show that the injured party reasonably has
placed special reliance on the breaching party's good faith.1 56 This reli-
ance removes the contract from the ordinary commercial arms-length
did not foreclose the availability of the tortious breach in the lender-borrower setting, the
California Supreme Court most likely would not allow tortious breach in the ordinary lender-
borrower case because it did not in the employer-employee setting); cf Lee v. Bank of
America, 218 Cal. App. 3d 914, 922-28, 267 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990) (Johnson, J., concurring
and dissenting) (comparing the bank-customer relationship to the insurer-insured relationship
under the guidelines of Foley, and reasoning that the tort exists in the context of banking).
153. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
156. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
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Should the borrower somehow obtain a loan, the borrower probably will
not be able to retrieve the assets or business interests that were lost as a
result of the bad faith breach of the lender. As with the insured, then,
the borrower's inability to resort successfully to other sources is a direct
result of the borrower having foregone opportunities to secure loan funds
from another lender at the outset.
The economic dilemma faced by the borrower seems to be most se-
vere in the case of an individual or small business borrower who has
pledged everything to finance a project. 162 Because there is so much
more at stake for this type of borrower than for the bank,163 the borrower
reasonably relies on the bank not to breach its lending agreement. Under
these circumstances, the relationship does not stem from an arms length
transaction. The economic dilemma faced by an injured individual or
small business borrower in a lender-borrower relationship therefore is
similar to that of an injured insured party in an insurer-insured
relationship.
The next comparison to make is the nature of the service provided
by the under relative to that provided by the insurer. The Foley court
distinguished the insurer-insured relationship from the employer-em-
ployee relationship by observing that while insurance has a quasi-public
service nature, employment provides no similar public service.i 4 The
Foley court noted that a party contracts with the insurance company to
be financially protected when potentially devastating events arise. 165 The
court rejected the argument that the employee is seeking financial secur-
ity by obtaining employment; instead, Foley regarded the employment
contract as an arms-length bargain between a "dealer" and "supplier."' 166
The Foley court's simple dealer-supplier analogy cannot be applied
to the lender-borrower relationship. It has long been recognized that
"banking has ceased to be, if it ever was, a matter of private concern
only, like the business of a merchant"; instead banking is a service in the
public interest. 167 The quasi-public service status of the bank derives
from its domination of individual business interests as well as the eco-
nomic stability of society as a whole. 168
162. See supra note 160.
163. Id. (borrowers were individuals or closely held corporations, and lenders were large
banks-Bank of America, Wells Fargo bank, Mitsui Manufacturers Bank, Security Pacific
National Bank, Lloyd's Bank, and Ameritrust Corporations).
164. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 692, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 234 (1988).
165. Id
166. Id.
167. State'Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 442, 1332 P. 755, 757
(1913) (quoting Shaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 604, 118 P. 80, 83 (1911)), aff'd, 238 U.S. 611
(1914).
168. See Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 364-65, 521 P.2d 441, 448, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 456 (1974) (banks "exert great influence upon the economic health of the nation")
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Because of banks' "superior stature" in the community, they mani-
fest an "aura of expertise and reliability that is greater than that of the
ordinary commercial enterprise." 169 Oklahoma, in recognizing a policy
of evenhandedness, prohibits banks from using their advantages against
their customers and requires that banks promote the economic needs of
the public. 170
It has been suggested that only certain circumstances give rise to a
breach by the bank of its special duty to prevent injury to its customers
and the public.17  These circumstances may be grouped into two general
categories: when the lender has superior bargaining power, and when the
lender diverges from an established course of conduct. The first category
is characterized by contractual relationships in which the borrower actu-
ally has relied on the expertise, knowledge, or guidance of the lender; and
contractual relationships in which the lender retains excessive control
over the borrower. The second category includes activities such as sud-
den demand of payment of a note after repeatedly ignoring late pay-
ments, sudden withdrawal of credit without prior notice, or unexpected
foreclosure on collateral. 172
(citing Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1954); A. MICHIE, 1 BANKS &
BANKING 2-3 (1973)); Anderson, 165 Cal. at 442, 132 P.2d at 757 ("Banks are indispensable
agencies through which the industry, trade and commerce of all civilized countries and com-
munities are now carried on. The banker is the universal broker over whose counter the ex-
changes of supply and demand are, in the final analysis, effected.") (quoting Shaake, 85 Kan.
at 604, 118 P. at 83); Commercial Cotton v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209
Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985) (banking "substantially affect[s] the public welfare"); Frankini v.
Bank of America, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 678, 88 P.2d 790, 796 (1939) (banking "intimately"
affects public welfare) (citing People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 154 Cal. 194, 97 P. 306
(1908)); Harrell, supra note 140, at 643 (banks' "financial power within the community
amounts to a virtual financial monopoly in the field of money lending' ") (quoting
Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982)).
169. Harrell, supra note 140, at 681. Harrell equated bankers with "doctors and lawyers"
because they "enjoy prestige in the community and a deference to their judgment in the area of
their specialty (finance, in the case of banks) which induces ordinary persons to rely on that
judgment." Id.
170. Djowharzadeh, 646 P.2d at 619. The Djowharzadeh court found that a special rela-
tionship existed between the bank and borrower, and that there was sufficient evidence to
support a claim for tortious breach of the covenant. Id. at 619-20. The court took
particular notice of banking practices and tradition which cultivates, encourages and
even advertises the fact that banks can and should be trusted. Indeed, the words
"trust," "security" and "guaranty" are a part of the name of many banks, including
defendant Bank. The fact that no prior Oklahoma cases or statutes specifically define
such a relationship is more of a tribute to past faithful performance of bankers than a
proof that a special duty does not exist or need only be optionally observed.
Id. at 620. See also Harrell, supra note 140, at 669 ("[tlhe public [ ] repose[s] confidence and
reliance that such institutions will behave according to the highest ethical standards").
171. Harrell, supra note 140, at 669, 677, 679.
172. Id.
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Under certain circumstances, then, the relationship between the
lender and the borrower is not at arms length. The unsophisticated bor-
rower relies on the financial expertise of the bank because of the bank's
status in the community. In these circumstances, a sudden withdrawal
of credit, refusal to extend credit against common practice, or demand of
payment has no adverse consequences for the bank and merely allows the
bank to take advantage of its supremacy in the lending market to the
detriment of the borrower. Thus, the bargaining powers of the unsophis-
ticated borrower and the bank are not equal.
These situations exemplify the need to deter a breach that is in the
lender's financial self-interest when the lender has superior bargaining
power. The Foley court found that the interests of the insurer and in-
sured are adverse when the insured has filed a claim. If the insurer were
liable only for contract damages, namely the amount due under the pol-
icy plus interest accrued, it would be in the insurer's interest to refrain
from paying the insured, invest the money in the market where it has the
potential to earn greater returns, and try to force a settlement. In this
way, the insurer possibly could pay even less than what it owed under the
policy.173 By contrast, the insured needs to be paid for the loss that has
occurred. The interests of the insurer and the insured thus are financially
at odds.
The Foley court distinguished the employment termination scenario
in which the parties' interests generally are aligned. Assuming that the
employer still has need for the employee's job, a fair assumption because
otherwise the employee would not be able to prove that the discharge
was in bad faith, the employer will have to hire and pay for the services
of another employee. By the time a suit is filed and litigated, the em-
ployer will have paid someone to perform the services in question. Addi-
tionally, the employer will have paid the recruiting and training costs to
replace the discharged employee. Therefore, unlike the insurer who will
not pay, the employer who wrongly fires an employee is not able to retain
money, earn interest, and eventually force a cheap settlement. "To the
contrary, he will already have paid fully for the one set of services needed
as an input in his productive process-before the plaintiff's contract
damages are even calculated."' 174
An examination of the respective interests of the lender and bor-
rower shows that under most circumstances they are adverse toward one
another. Because the interest of the borrower is always against breach,
the economic interest of the lender will be determinable.
173. Brief for Respondent at 56, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654 (1988)
(No. LA32148) (citing Wallis v. Superior Ct., 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123,
128 (1984)).
174. Id.
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If the lender is subject only to contract damages upon breach, then
from a purely profit-seeking perspective looking only at the particular
funds in question, it is in the lender's financial interest not to deliver the
loan funds or not to extend credit and demand full payment of the loan.
Generally, the measure of contract damages for breach of an agreement
to loan money is the difference, if any, between the rate of interest during
the term of the loan and the replacement loan's rate of interest (or the
interest rate "generally available" when the breach occurred if the bor-
rower is unable to obtain alternate financing).1 75 In many cases only
nominal damages are recoverable. 176 Special damages, such as lost prof-
its, are recoverable only if they are foreseeable. 77
Before the suit even comes to trial, the lender can retain the loan
funds or foreclose on the security interest and invest the funds at a poten-
tially higher return than the nominal contract damages for which it will
be liable. The lender also can hope to settle the case for less than it can
earn by investing the retained funds. 178
In summary, the cost of the breach ultimately determines the align-
ment of interests. An employer saves money by performing a contract.
By contrast, an insurer saves money by breaching a contract. Similarly,
a lender may save money by breaching a contract.
In Kruse, the court held that when the bank had promised to repay
borrowers' creditors and instead made efforts to liquidate properties held
as security, the bank was acting in its "economic self-interest," adverse to
the interests of the borrower. 79 The court held that this was not a bad
faith breach, however, because it did not find the bank had made an en-
forceable promise. ' 80 Perhaps the court would have decided otherwise if
it had found a promise by the bank. With financial interests at odds, the
bank had nothing to lose and the borrower, everything.
In situations when the bargaining powers of the parties are not
equal, namely when the borrower is unsophisticated or is an individual or
small business, the borrower reasonably relies on the lender not to breach
its promise even if it is in the lender's economic self-interest to do so.
Such a transaction is not at arms length, and under these circumstances,
the relationship is similar to that of the insurer and insured. A disincen-
tive to breach is necessary. The insurance cases provide potential tort
175. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 93 (1988).
176. Id. § 94.
177. Id. Contracts § 99. The annotation provides a "checklist of elements of proof"
needed to establish damages for lost profits, including the "lender's knowledge of [the] bor-
rower's intended use of [the] proceeds," and the "lender's knowledge of [the] unavailability or
limited availability of alternative financing on equivalent terms." Id. § 100.
178. See Checchio, supra note 3, at 2 (banks settle out-of-court in many cases).
179. Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 67, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 234-35
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
180. Id. at 58-59, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
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liability as a disincentive for bad faith breach. Likewise, lender liability
cases should employ potential tort liability as a disincentive to bad faith
breach by the lender.
The propriety of the tort, however, depends on the strength of the
similarity between insurance and lending as weighed against the three
opposing concerns: the traditional separation between tort and contract,
economic stability, and the statutory protection already afforded the bor-
rower against a bad faith breach."" 1 Foley held that employment was not
similar enough to insurance to tip the scale in favor of the tort when the
similarities were balanced against these opposing concerns.182 A balanc-
ing of the similarities between lending and insurance against the oppos-
ing concerns, however, tips the scale in favor of allowing the tort in
lending situations.
The Foley court explained that the traditional separation between
tort and contract is rooted in their different purposes.183 The goal of
contract law is the protection of party expectations, and the purpose of
contract remedies is to compensate.18 4 The goal of tort law, however, is
to provide disincentives to certain behavior that society will not tolerate;
therefore, the purpose of tort remedies is to deter as well as compen-
sate. 18 5 Because the covenant is a contract term, its breach usually gives
rise to only contract damages. 186 Foley held that only in rare circum-
stances, such as those of insurance, will a breach warrant tort recov-
ery. 187 Contract damages will be inadequate because in those
circumstances breach of the covenant constitutes behavior that society
will not tolerate. The opposing concern of keeping tort and contract sep-
arate therefore is weakened under circumstances when the breach im-
poses injury that society will not tolerate.
The relationship between lender and borrower is most similar to
that of insurer and insured when the lender bank breaches its promise to
loan funds or extend credit to the individual or small business borrower.
The question is, will society tolerate the detriment that this type of bor-
rower suffers, such as loss of property, loss of business, emotional dis-
tress, and bankruptcy?
Although the lender's breach may allow the lender to invest the
funds at a higher return, thus increasing the flow of funds in the econ-
omy, for each breach a business may be destroyed or an individual may
be forced into bankruptcy. That party is completely removed from the
181. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
182. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 234-35 (1988).
183. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 684, 765 P.2d at 390, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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market. Society should not tolerate the disabling of these market partici-
pants because the economy depends upon the flow of funds produced by
their activity. Thus, there is a need to deter the lender from a bad faith
breach that will result in the disabling of market participants.
Furthermore, nominal contract damages are inadequate to compen-
sate the borrower who faces a severe economic dilemma involving bank-
ruptcy and loss of substantially all assets. Tort damages are necessary to
make the borrower whole under the circumstances in which the lender-
borrower relationship is most closely analogous to the insurer-insured
relationship.
In Foley, the court recognized that contract damages may be inade-
quate to redress the claims of employees fired in bad faith.1 88 The court,
however, held that there was an adequate alternative in the wide range of
statutory protections afforded the employee. 189
Although banking is a regulated industry, the borrower does not
have available statutory protections against a bad faith breach of the loan
agreement.190 Therefore, existing statutes add no strength to the argu-
ment for disallowance of the tort.
A third concern is the tort's potential threat to economic policy and
stability. Tort awards often are unpredictable because unlike in contract,
foreseeability is irrelevant in determining the damages.19I The argument
against the tort is that the unpredictable damage awards will lead the
lender to raise its rates in an attempt to shift these costs to its customers,
or to refuse to lend to certain higher-risk borrowers. Borrowing will be-
come difficult and even impossible for many, and the economy will suffer
by the decrease in the flow of funds. 192
Assuming the argument that tort recovery would threaten economic
stability is realistic, the problem is that either way economic stability is
threatened. If only contract damages are allowed then the disabling of
market participants will threaten economic stability. If tort damages are
allowed, the increase in the cost of lending will be directly proportional
188. Id. at 693-94, 765 P.2d at 396-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
189. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
190. See Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections,
103 BANKING L.J. 220, 223-25 (1986) (listing the U.C.C.-requiring good faith-and RICO-
for claims for improperly charging excessive interest-as statutory theories of lender liability);
Harrell, supra note 140, at 641 ("Although [the relationship between bank and its customer]
has come to be supplemented by federal and state legislation and regulation, in large part,
these laws and regulations have left undisturbed the fundamental nature of the contractual
relationship between a bank and its customer") (footnotes omitted); see also Hawley, Introduc-
tion to Lender Liability, 48 ALA. LAW. 214, 214-15 (1987) (discussing three statutory liability
theories-RICO, federal securities liabilities, and the superfund laws-that do not protect a
borrower from bad faith breach of the loan contract).
191. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 133 (1988).
192. See Note, supra note 147, at 441.
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to the increased number of lender liability suits for tortious breach. The
increased cost in lending will threaten economic stability.
I. A Legislative Proposal to Achieve an Economic Balance
An economic balance is needed. A cap on the amount of recover-
able non-contract damages would provide predictability in tort damages.
Limited tort damages dissolve the threats to economic stability, enable
the injured borrower's claim to be redressed adequately, and still deter
the lender from breaching the contract in bad faith. The ideal cap would
equalize the bargaining power and align the economic interests of the
parties to a loan agreement.
A cap on non-economic damages has been utilized in medical mal-
practice cases. In 1975, the California legislature enacted Civil Code sec-
tion 3333.2, which provides in relevant part:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience,
physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses
exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).193
The enactment of this cap on medical malpractice damages was a re-
sponse to "the medical malpractice insurance crisis," 194 which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has declared a legitimate public interest. 195 The
high cost of medical malpractice insurance brought on by enormous mal-
practice judgments, prompted the legislature to place a cap on medical
malpractice damages. The potential high cost of lending likewise should
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1990).
194. Note, The Constitutionality of Recent Efforts to Limit Personal Injury Damages Fol-
lowing the 1984-85 MICRA Decisions, 13 W. ST. U.L. REv. 595, 600 (1986) (authored by
Monica Lynch) (stating that the crisis was "quite similar to the current liability insurance
crisis"). The legislature summarized its purpose in enacting the statute as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State
of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in
a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the medi-
cally indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion of
physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health care available to citi-
zens of this state. The Legislature, acting within the scope of its police powers, finds
the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide an adequate and reason-
able remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public health and safety consider-
ations permit now and into the foreseeable future.
Amendment to Assembly Bill No. 1, Ch. 2, Sec. 12.5, § 1(b), 2d Extraordinary Sess., reprinted
in 1975 CAL. STATUTES & AMENDMENTS TO THE CODES 4007.
195. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 370-74, 683 P.2d
670, 676-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677-81 (1984); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d
137, 162-63, 695 P.2d 665, 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386 (1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892
(1985).
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prompt the legislature to enact a cap for tort recovery in lender liability
cases.
This legislative proposal is consistent with the Foley holding that the
legislature should determine non-contract remedies. 196 The court then
would be responsible to determine whether the lender and borrower
under the facts of the case enjoyed a special relationship sufficiently simi-
lar to the relationship of the insurer and insured. Factors indicating that
the borrower was unsophisticated, or was an individual or small business
relying on the financial expertise of the bank, would be determinative.
Conclusion
The goal of lender liability adjudications is to redress adequately the
claims of the borrower while maintaining economic stability. Allowing a
limited tort for breach of the covenant is a possible and practical solu-
tion. The tort finds its justification in the similarities between lender-
borrower relationships and insurer-insured relationships. These similari-
ties outweigh the concerns for limiting breach of the covenant to contract
damages.
History of the tortious breach of the covenant shows that the tort is
not well-defined in lender liability cases. Because the borrower poten-
tially may suffer severe economic and emotional distress damages, con-
tract damages are inadequate to compensate the borrower when the
lender breaches the loan agreement in bad faith. Because of these ad-
verse consequences and the superior status of banks in the community,
society should not tolerate this type of behavior by the lender, but rather
should hold the lender to a policy of fair dealing and even-handedness.
Thus there is a need to allow recovery beyond ordinary contract
damages.
Without a limit, however, the sharp increase in the cost of lending
due to potential tort liability could threaten economic stability. There-
fore, a cap similar to that for medical malpractice claims is desirable to
maintain predictability for each party's financial obligation in a loan
agreement. The goal of this cap would be to equalize as much as possible
the amount at risk for each party to the agreement. This equalization
would insure that neither party would find it economically beneficial to
breach the contract arbitrarily. Equalization of risk would insure that
unless unforeseeable circumstances arose making performance impracti-
cable, it would be more expensive to breach than to fulfill the terms of
the contract.
Allowing capped tort damages is a solution that will compensate the
borrower, deter the lender, and achieve economic stability. The duty of
196. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 700, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 239 (1988).
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good faith and fair dealing will protect each party's interest in obtaining
the benefits expected from the contract, and will further society's interest
in maintaining the flow of funds in the market.

